The purpose of this paper is to consider a representation of the HOL theorem-prover in the calculus of constructions with the property that consistency results from the calculus of constructions imply such results in HOL. This kind of representation is impossible using the propositions-as-types representation of logic and equality, but it is possible if a different representation is used.
Since the basic formalism of higher-order logic (HOL) is weaker than that of the calculus of constructions, it seems natural to interpret the HOL theorem prover [1] in the latter. However, there are some problems in carrying out such an interpretation. The HOL theorem prover is based on classical logic, includes an -choice operator, and includes a principle of extensionality in the form The calculus of constructions is based on constructive logic, and although it can be consistently extended to classical logic by postulating excluded middle, it has been known for some time that excluded middle together with anchoice operator leads to proof irrelevance, which says that all terms in a small type are Leibniz equal; see [2] , which follows [3] and [4] . This would seem to make an interpretation of HOL in the calculus of constructions impossible.
However, these problems all involve representing logic in type theories using the proposition-as-types representation (also known as the formulas-as-types notion or the Curry-Howard isomorphism), in which the types are interpreted as logical formulas and the terms as proofs and, a type represents a provable formula if and only if it is inhabited. There is an alternative representation, which we might call the Frege representation, in which there is a type Bool in which there are distinct terms T and F, a term of type Bool represents a formula, and a formula in this sense A is provable if and only if A = Bool T.
In this paper, I will use the Frege representation to interpret HOL in the calculus of constructions. To make the paper relatively self-contained, I will review the definition of the calculus of constructions in §1 and the propositionsas-types representation of logic with equality in §2. In §3, I will take up the Frege-style representation of logic with equality, and in §4 I will use this to interpret the HOL theorem-prover. In §5, the conclusion, I will discuss further work.
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Here dom(Γ) = {x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n }. The system has one axiom, namely
It has the following rules: From now on, all environments will be assumed to be well-formed.
Representing Logic with Equality, Propositions-as-Types
Let us review the representation of logic and equality in the calculus of constructions under the propositions-as-types representation. This material comes from [7, §6] , where more details will be found. It is easy to show special cases of (Application) and (Abstraction) are
The conjunction of two propositions A and B is defined by
The terms of type A ∧ B are ordered pairs whose first element is in A and whose second element is in B. The pairing operator and its projections give us the usual properties of conjunction, including
The disjunction of two propositions A and B is defined by
The terms of type A∨B are disjoint unions of A and B. These unions together with their injections and the case operator give us the usual properties of disjunction, including
The type void, which is intended to be empty, and which is written ⊥ when it is desired to emphasize that it is a proposition, is defined by
It follows from strong normalization that there is no closed term of type void. The negation of a proposition A is defined by
The existential quantifier (∀x : A)B where A, B : Prop and x ∈ FV(A) is defined by
The terms of type (∃x : A)B are pairs whose first element is in A and whose second element is in B. However, the pairs are defined differently from those of conjunction types, and the different typing means that although there is a first projection, there is no typable second projection; see [11] . This pairing operator and the partial projection function give us the usual properties of the existential quantifier, including
We can also define Leibniz equality over any type: if M, N : A, then
Then it is easy to prove the usual properties of equality, including the following (for M, N : A):
It is not hard to see from this that we have all the usual properties of constructive predicate logic with equality.
We can interpret classical logic by assigning to an atomic constant the type
We can also represent truth values:
It is easy to prove Bool : Prop, T : Bool, and F : Bool.
Berardi [12] assumes extensionality in the following form:
where
This implies (as Berardi shows) that all inhabited small types are models of untyped λ-calculus, and hence that the successor function on the natural numbers, σ : N → N, has a fixed-point! For this reason, we will not assume this form of extensionality in this paper.
For more on extensionality, see Appendix A.
Representing Logic with Equality, Frege Style
To carry out the Frege style representation consistently, we need to assume
Representing the logical connectives in the Frege style is easy; see [7, pp. 73-74] . We start with the familiar if ...then ...else operator:
The connectives can now be defined as follows:
Then the usual truth table rules for these connectives hold as conversions.
The quantifiers, however, are another matter. We want
(We may need to add arguments to (∀ b x : A)B and (∃ b x : A)B.) There are two problems in achieving these properties. One is that the logic of the calculus of constructions is not classical. This problem can be easily fixed: postulate
This assumption and the assumption that (∀n : N)(¬(σn = N 0)) are proved consistent in [7, Theorem 23] . Essentially the same method can be used to prove that the above classical assumption and ¬(T = Bool F) are consistent.
For the rest of this paper, we will assume both of these.
The other problem is more serious: even if the logic is classical, we cannot assume for A : Prop and B : A → Bool
Furthermore, within the logic, there is no way to prove that the only terms of type Bool are T and F.
Nevertheless, we can define (∀ b x : A)(Bx), where A : Prop and B : A → Bool.
To do this, we first let
Then we can define (∀ b x : A)(Bx) to be Π b AB, where
where case is defined along with the injections inl and inr for the disjoint sum (disjunction) in [7, Definition 21] . Note that it is shown in [7] that for A, B, C : Prop, M : A, N : B, F : A → C, and G : B → C,
Note that the type of Π b is given by
It is then easy to show that if M :
where V is the obvious proof that
On the other hand, if M :
These are two important properties of Π b in one direction. To get the other direction, assume that we have a proof U of
Since Π b ABM V : Bool, it follows that we must have M :
Now from the second disjunct, we get, as above,
which contradicts the conclusion of U . It therefore follows that the first disjunct holds, and so we have E 1 , or (∀x : A)(Bx = Bool T). Similarly, given a proof U of
we can conclude that (∃x : A)(Bx = Bool F). Thus, we have the desired properties of the universal quantifier in both directions.
If we define the predicate
then it follows that
For the existential quantifier, let
and define
The desired properties of the existential quantifier follow in much the same way as do those for the universal quantifier. (A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A n ).
To do this we need the universal closure of
If 
As an example, let us define Boolean Leibniz equality M = bA N over a type A : Prop, where M, N : A. Here,
The definition is then
We can then take M = bA N as an abbreviation for Eq b AM N .
This gives us classical logic with equality. The special case of extensionality
now follows by definition.
Interpreting HOL
Since the HOL theorem prover has a mechanism to convert some 2 predicates into types, it seems natural to interpret HOL types as calculus of constructions predicates. This gives us a class of interpretations.
The types of HOL have the following syntax:
where α represents a type variable and c represents a type constant. These types can be interpreted in the calculus of constructions as follows:
(1) Interpret α as variable α * : A → Prop for some type A. (2) Interpret c with arity n as a constant
for some types A 1 , A 2 , . . . , A n , A (n may be 0). 
HOL terms have the syntax:
The HOL terms are interpreted in the calculus of constructions as follows: 
We interpret these as follows:
where it is provable that (∀x : Bool)(BOOLx → (∀y : Bool)(BOOLy → BOOL(⊃ b xy))). 
and then postulate for it
We 
Remark 3 Note that if we were dealing with the definition description operator, we could use this technique and define
ι b ≡ λA : Prop . λa : A . λf : A → Bool . λx : A . λu : (fx = Bool T) ∧ (∀y : A)(fy = Bool T ⊃ y = A x)) . x.
This makes the value of ι b Aaf the object which can be proved to satisfy the Boolean predicate function f . For the description operator, the problem of choice does not arise.
Deductive systems in HOL are defined in terms of sequents. An HOL sequent is a pair (Γ, t), where Γ is a finite set of terms of type bool (the HOL type) and t is a term of that type. The interpretation t * of an HOL term t of type bool has type Bool. If Γ ≡ t 1 , t 2 , . . . , t n , then the interpretation of Γ is Γ * ≡ t * 1 , t * 2 , . . . , t * n . In HOL, Γ t means that the sequent (Γ, t) follows from the inference rules. Here, (Γ t) * will be
The deductive system of HOL is defined by eight rules of inference, each of which has the form
For each of these eight rules of inference, we would like to prove in the calculus of constructions
This turns out to be easy for the following seven rules:
(1) Assumption introduction t t.
(2) Reflexivity t = t.
where [t 2 /x]t 1 is substitution with bound variables changed automatically to avoid clashes. (4) Substitution 
where none of the type variables α 1 , α 2 , . . . , α n occur free in Γ and no distinct variables in t become identified after the substitution of the σ i for the α i . (6) Discharging an assumption However, there is a problem with the eighth rule:
where x does not occur free in Γ.
The problem is that it is not possible to prove in HOL that if Γ t 1 = t 2 then t 1 and t 2 are convertible. Proving the interpretation of this rule would require postulating the following version of Boolean extensionality:
which does not seem to be provable.
Conclusion
This interpretation depends on three unproved assumptions:
The first two of these are consistent, by an easy modification of the proof of [7, Theorem 23 ], as noted above. The third seems reasonable, since it is known that η-reduction satisfies the Church-Rosser property. I conjecture that the consistency of all three of these umproved assumptions can be proved consistent by using a term model and so modelling HOL that two HOL terms are Boolean equal if and only if they are convertible, but I have not checked the details.
It is natural to ask whether this interpretation of the HOL theorem prover in the calculus of constructions would be consistent if the choice function were defined as in Remark 2 to satisfy the general semantics of a choice operator, with its extra unproved assumption. There might be cause for nervousness about this unproved assumption because we would have both extensionality and the choice operator. However, the argument of [2] PROOF. Since AC and EM imply PI, it is sufficient to prove that the existence of f implies EM. Let α : Prop, and define U, V : N → Prop by Thus,
By a constructively valid part of distribution,
From this and extensionality, we get
Hence, 
)(P x))(P ( AP h)).
In [2] , these constants are called AC F and AC A respectively, and the authors say that assuming these two constants is stronger than the set-theoretic form of the axiom of choice.
To use these postulates in the proof of the Theorem of Diaconescu, we need to use λu : N → Prop . λh : (∃x : N)(ux) . Nuh for f . But this function has an extra argument, and so a and b now have to be defined by
where h U and h V are the obvious proofs of (∃x : N)Ux and (∃x : N)V x respectively. This means that from (A.2), we do not get (A.3), but only
We could try defining b as NV h U , but then instead of V b, we would need to use the equality of U and V , and since this requires the equivalence of U and V , instead of V b, we would get
Instead of (A.1), we would have
and so the conclusion of the proof would be y : α ¬α ∨ α, a triviality.
It would be possible to get around this by assuming an axiom of the form This axiom is similar to an axiom assumed by Maehara for the -symbol in [15] . However, with this axiom, extensionality would no longer be needed for the proof of the Theorem of Diaconescu, since the only inference in its proof that used extensionality would be justified by the above axiom. So this axiom plus AC implies PI. This makes assuming this axiom dubious.
It appears that the claim in [2] that the postulation of the two constants and in is stronger than the set-theoretic form of AC is not justified.
